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Computer infections such as viruses and worms spread over networks of con-
tacts between computers, with different types of networks being exploited by
different types of infections. Here we analyze the structures of several of these
networks, exploring their implications for modes of spread and the control of
infection. We argue that vaccination strategies that focus on a limited number
of network nodes, whether targeted or randomly chosen, are in many cases
unlikely to be effective. An alternative dynamic mechanism for the control of
contagion, called throttling, is introduced and argued to be effective under a
range of conditions.
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Computer viruses and worms are an increasing problem for users of computers throughout
the world. By some estimates 2003 was the worst year yet: viruses halted or hindered operations
at numerous businesses and other organizations, disrupted ATMs, delayed airline flights, and
even affected emergency call centers. The Sobig virus alone is said to have caused more than
US$30 billion in damage.1 And most experts agree that the damage could easily have been
much worse. For example, Staniford et al. describe a worm that could infect the entire Internet
in around 30 seconds [1]. A worm of this scale and speed could launch a distributed denial-of-
service attack that would bring the entire network to a halt, crippling critical infrastructure.
In this paper we use the term virus to refer to malicious software that requires help from
computer users to spread to other computers. Email viruses, for instance, require someone to
read an email message or open an attached file in order to spread. We use the term worm for
infections that spread without user intervention. Because they spread unaided, worms can often
spread much faster than viruses.
Computer infections such as viruses and worms spread over networks of contacts between
computers, with different types of networks being exploited by different types of infections. The
structure of contact networks affects the rate and extent of spreading of computer infections, just
as it does for human diseases [2, 3, 4, 5, 6], and understanding this structure is thus a key element
in the control of infection.
Both traditional and network-based epidemiological models have been applied to computer
contagion [2, 3, 4]. Recent work has emphasized the effects of a network’s degree distribution.
A network consists of nodes or vertices connected by lines or edges, and the number of edges
connected to a vertex is called its degree. Of particular interest are scale-free networks, in
which the degree distribution follows a power-law, the fraction pk of vertices with degree k
falling off with increasing k as k−α for some constant α. This structure has been reported for
1Citations documenting these events are listed on http://www.cs.unm.edu/˜judd/virus.html, as
well as citations to each of the viruses and worms mentioned in this paper.
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several technological networks including the Internet [7] and the world wide web [8, 9].
Infections spreading over scale-free networks are highly resilient to control strategies based
on randomly vaccinating or otherwise disabling vertices. This is bad news for traditional com-
puter virus prevention efforts, which use roughly this strategy. On the other hand, targeted
vaccination, in which one immunizes the highest-degree vertices, can be very effective [10, 11].
It is important to appreciate that these results rely crucially on the assumption of a power-
law degree distribution, and their derivation also assumes that the contact patterns between
nodes are static. Many technological networks relevant to the spread of viruses, however, are
not scale-free. Vaccination strategies focusing on highly connected network nodes are unlikely
to be effective in such cases. Furthermore, network topology is not necessarily constant. In
many cases the topology depends on the replication mechanism employed by a virus and can
be manipulated by virus writers to circumvent particular control strategies that we attempt. If,
for instance, targeted vaccination strategies were found to be effective against viruses spreading
over scale-free networks, the viruses might well be rewritten so as to change the structure of the
network to some non-scale-free form instead.
To make these ideas more concrete, we consider here four illustrative technological net-
works, each of which is vulnerable to attack: (A) the network of possible connections between
computers using the Internet Protocol (IP); (B) a network of shared administrator accounts for
desktop computers; (C) a network of email address books; (D) a network of email messages
passed between users.
In network A, the IP network, each computer has a 32-bit IP address and there is a routing in-
frastructure that supports communication between any two addresses. We consider the network
in which the nodes are IP addresses and two nodes are connected if communication is possible
between the corresponding computers. Although some segments of the IP address space are in-
visible to others, the portion of the network within, for instance, a corporation will generally be
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Figure 1: Left: degree distributions for the IP and administrator networks. The administrator network
data were collected on a system of 518 users of 382 machines at a large corporation. Computers in this
network are connected if any user has administrative privileges on both computers. Right: Cumulative
degree distributions for the email address book and email traffic networks, plotted on logarithmic scales.
The email address book data were collected from a large university [6]. The email traffic data were
collected for complete email activity of a large corporate department over a four-month period.
almost completely connected. Many epidemics spread over this IP network. Notable examples
include the Nimda and SQLSlammer worms.
Network B is a product of the common operating system feature that allows computer sys-
tem administrators to read and write data on the disks of networked machines. Some worms,
including Nimda and Bugbear, can spread by copying themselves from disk to disk over this
network.
Network C is a directed graph with nodes representing users and a connection from user i to
user j if j’s email address appears in i’s address book. Many email viruses use address books to
spread (e.g., ILoveYou). A closely related network is network D, which is an undirected graph
in which the nodes represent computer users and two users are connected if they have recently
exchanged email. Viruses such as Klez spread over this network.
Fig. 1 shows measured degree distributions for examples of each of the four networks. In
network A all vertices have the same degree, so the distribution has a single peak at this value
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(blue histogram). In network B, the distribution consists of four discrete peaks, presumably
corresponding to different classes of computers, administrators, or administration strategies
(red histogram).
The two email networks have more continuous distributions and are shown as cumulative
histograms. Although neither network has a power-law degree distribution, both have moder-
ately long tails, which suggests that targeted vaccination strategies might be effective. Calcula-
tions show however that for the address-book network about 10% of the highest-degree nodes
would need to be vaccinated to prevent an epidemic from spreading [6] while the email traffic
network would require about 87%. The first of these figures is probably too high for an effec-
tive targeted vaccination strategy, and the second is clearly far too high. (Targeted vaccination
would be entirely ineffective in the other two networks as well, because the nodes are much
more highly connected.)
The two email networks illustrate the way in which different virus replication strategies
can lead to different network topologies. An email virus could look for addresses in address
books, thereby spreading over a network with a topology like that of network C, or it could look
elsewhere on the machine, giving a topology more like D. Another example is provided by the
Nimda virus, which infects web servers by targeting random IP addresses, producing a network
like network A. However, if the virus had a more intelligent way of selecting IP addresses to
attack (say, by inspecting hyperlinks), then it might spread over a topology more like that of the
world wide web, which is believed to have a power-law degree distribution [8, 9].
A control strategy is needed that is immune to changes in network topology and that does
not require us to know the mechanisms of infections before an outbreak. Control strategies need
to be highly effective against malicious infection but largely transparent to legitimate activities.
A number of methods for containing computer epidemics have been proposed [12]. One such
strategy is throttling, first introduced for the control of misbehaving programs [13] and recently
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extended to computer network connections [14]. In this context, throttling limits the number
of new connections a computer can make to other machines in a given time period. Because it
works by limiting spreading rates rather than stopping spread altogether, the method does not
completely eliminate infections but only slows them down. Frequently however this is all that
is necessary to render a virus harmless or easily controlled by other means.
The network traffic generated by today’s viruses and worms is fundamentally different from
normal network traffic. For a virus to spread it needs to propagate itself to many different ma-
chines, and to spread quickly it must do so at a high rate. For example, the Nimda worm attempts
to infect web servers at a rate of around 400 new machines per second, which greatly exceeds
the normal rate of connections to new web servers of about one per second or slower [15].
A throttling mechanism that limited connections to new web servers to about one per second
would slow Nimda by a factor of 400 without affecting typical legitimate traffic. This could
easily be enough to change a serious infection into a minor annoyance, which could then be
eliminated by traditional means. Slowing the spread of Nimba by a factor of 400 (from a day to
over a year) would have allowed plenty of time to develop and deploy signatures and prophylac-
tic software patches. (Of course, if throttling were implemented on only a subset of the nodes
in a network, then infections could spread more easily.) In addition to reducing virus spread,
throttling has the practical benefit of reducing the amount of traffic generated by an epidemic,
thus reducing demand on networking equipment—often the primary symptom of an attack.
To summarize, approaches for controlling epidemics in computer networks are unlikely
to be generally effective if they rely on detailed assumptions about network topology. More-
over, the topology of contact networks is often dependent on a virus’s replication and infection
strategy. Better and more general approaches to restricting contagion are needed. Throttling
provides one example of how rapidly spreading infections may be controlled in the future.
Throttling can be effective for all network topologies, although only if normal network traffic
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is significantly different from that generated by spreading epidemics. Throttling does not elim-
inate computer epidemics; it simply causes them to spread more slowly, allowing time for the
slower mechanisms of conventional prevention and clean-up.
The disparity between the speed of computer attacks (machine and network speed) and the
speed of manual response (human speed) has increased in recent years. As this trend continues,
automated mechanisms like throttling will likely become an essential tool for controlling those
attacks, complementing the largely manual approach of software patching in use today. The
idea of rate limits is not specific to viruses, and could be applied to any situation in which an
attack or cascading failure occurs faster than possible human response.
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